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本文应用大小股东之间代理冲突的理论分析框架,研究了股权结构对于大股东隧道挖掘行为以及公司价值的影响。研究发现,大股东的隧道挖掘行为与其持股比例成显著的倒U型关系,股权制衡能够抑制隧道挖掘行为和缓解大、小股东之间的代理冲突;公司价值与第一大股东持股比例成显著的U型关系,股权制衡能在一定程度上提升公司价值,但效果不显著。研究结果证明,投资者能够识别股权结构所代表的代理问题,并给代理问题较大的公司予以较低的定价。
This paper applies the theoretical analysis framework of agent conflict between large and small shareholders to study the impact of ownership structure on the tunneling of large shareholders and the value of the company. The research shows that the tunneling behavior of major shareholders has a significant inverted U-shaped relationship with its shareholding ratio. Equity checks and balances can restrain the tunneling behavior and alleviate the agency conflicts between large and small shareholders. The relationship between company value and the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio A significant U-shaped relationship, equity checks and balances can enhance the company’s value to some extent, but the effect is not significant. The result of the study proves that investors can identify the agency problem represented by the ownership structure and lower the price of the company with the larger problem.