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本文建立考虑产品差异的三阶段双寡头博弈模型:第一阶段政府选择R&D(Research and Development)补贴率,第二阶段企业确定自己的R&D水平,第三阶段企业确定产品价格进行伯川德竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了R&D竞争、R&D卡特尔、共同实验、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等五种R&D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R&D补贴率。研究表明,当技术溢出程度较低且产品水平差异不大时,政府给予采用R&D竞争策略企业的补贴率不高于采用R&D卡特尔策略的企业;当技术溢出程度较高且产品水平差异较大时,结果则相反。在政府进行最优补贴后,从促进技术进步、扩大企业规模以及社会福利最大化的角度来看,五种R&D策略中,共同实验最差,技术共享联盟和研究共同体则最优。
This paper establishes a three-stage duopoly game model that considers product differentiation: the government chooses the research and development subsidy rate in the first stage, the firm determines its own R & D level in the second stage and the Bertrand competition for the third stage. According to whether the duopoly cooperates in the second and third phases, five R & D strategies such as R & D competition, R & D cartel, common experiment, technology sharing coalition and research community are given, and the corresponding government optimal R & D subsidy rate is obtained. The research shows that when the technology spillover degree is low and the product level difference is not big, the subsidy rate that the government gives to the enterprises adopting R & D competition strategy is not higher than the enterprises adopting R & D cartel strategy. When the technology spillover degree is higher and the product level difference is larger When the result is the opposite. After the government has made the optimal subsidy, the five R & D strategies have the worst joint experiment, the technology alliance and the research community are the best in terms of promoting technological progress, expanding the scale of enterprises and maximizing social welfare.