本文首先用具有线性需求和规模收益不变生产技术的Cournot双头模型来刻画国际市场份额竞争。指出 ,如果参与国际竞争的本国企业是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,那么 ,无论竞争对手是否是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,本国企业所有者总是有积极性操纵经营者的激励 ,特别的 ,在只有本国企业作出单边激励选择的情况下 ,这种操纵可以使本国企业生产Stackelberg领先者产量成为可以置信的承诺。它在这里所起到的作用是与出口补贴在战略性贸易政策分析中所起到的作用相一致的。如果考虑到从过去的GATT到现在的WTO都规定政府不得以任何形式参与国际竞争 ,这个结论就更有趣了。因为无须政府帮助 ,本国企业所有者凭借自身的力量就能实现有利于本国企业的竞争结果。这种民间对政府的替代是有意义的。在双边激励选择的情况下 ,两国企业陷入了“囚徒困境”。本国企业只有诉诸于本国政府对国际市场的干预 ,才能重新获得Stackelberg领先者的地位 ;但与对它的传统理解相比 ,这种地位已然弱化。最后 ,我们还证明 ,根据相当一般的条件 ,所有者决定的最优经营者激励只与竞争类型 (数量竞争还是价格竞争 )有关 ,而与企业的产品类型 (替代品还是互补品 )无关。 This paper first characterizes the international market share competition by using the Cournot two-headed model with linear demand and constant returns to scale. He pointed out that if the domestic enterprises involved in international competition are enterprises that separate the ownership from the management rights, the domestic enterprise owners always have the incentive to manipulate the operators irrespective of whether the competitors are the enterprises that separate the ownership from the management rights. In particular, With only unilateral incentives for domestic firms to make choices, such manipulations can make the country's own company's production of Stackelberg leaders a credible promise. Its role here is consistent with the role that export subsidies play in strategic trade policy analysis. This conclusion is even more interesting given the fact that the government, from the GATT in the past to the current WTO, must not engage in international competition in any form. Because without the help of the government, domestic business owners, by virtue of their own power, can realize the competitive result that is favorable to their own enterprises. This civil alternative to the government makes sense. In the case of bilateral incentives, the enterprises of the two countries are caught in the “prisoner's dilemma.” Domestic enterprises can regain the status of Stackelberg leader only by resorting to the intervention of their own governments in international markets; however, this status has weakened compared to its traditional understanding. Finally, we also show that, under fairly general conditions, the optimal manager incentive decided by the owner is only related to the type of competition (quantitative or price competition) and not to the product type of the firm (substitutes or complements).