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本文通过考察企业信息披露对投资者获取内部信息决策的影响,证明了企业公共信息质量与资本成本之间存在着先下降后上升的关系。一方面,所有企业自愿选择的信息披露质量都小于社会最优值,监管机构应该通过披露监管强制企业提高信息披露质量;另一方面,随着企业规模的增加,自愿选择的信息披露质量和社会最优值都会相应增加。因此对于大企业,尽管其信息披露质量高于小企业,但是仍然低于社会最优,所以应该对大企业或者企业规模大的股票市场实行更严格的监管。而对于小企业而言,统一监管要求的信息披露质量已经高于小企业的社会最优值,因此对小企业或者企业规模小的股票市场则应该实行相对宽松的监管。
By examining the impact of corporate information disclosure on investors’ decision to acquire internal information, this paper proves the relationship between the quality of corporate public information and the cost of capital first declines and then increases. On the one hand, the quality of information disclosure voluntarily chosen by all enterprises is less than the social optimal value. Regulators should force enterprises to improve the quality of information disclosure through disclosure supervision. On the other hand, as the size of enterprises increases, the quality of information disclosure voluntarily chosen and society The best value will be a corresponding increase. Therefore, for large enterprises, although the quality of information disclosure is higher than that of small enterprises, they are still below the social optimum, so more strict supervision should be implemented for large enterprises or large-scale stock markets of enterprises. For small businesses, the quality of information disclosure required by the unified regulation is already higher than the social optimality of small enterprises, so relatively loose regulation should be implemented for small-sized enterprises or small-scale stock markets.