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文章依据铁矿石价格谈判的背景和原则,构建了供应链上游资源垄断者和下游两生产企业之间竞争及竞合的两个博弈定价模型。研究表明,供应链上游资源垄断者主要依据下游生产企业的利润水平确定其资源定价,影响下游议价能力的根本因素是其产量而非谈判技巧,竞合策略下价格谈判的先行者将获得更大的产量和利润优势。算例仿真结果则显示,与竞争策略相比,合作谈判策略能有效提高供应链下游生产企业的议价能力,降低上游垄断者的资源定价能力,有效缩减整体谈判成本。
Based on the background and principle of iron ore price negotiation, this paper constructs two game pricing models of competition and competition between the upstream monopolist and the downstream two production enterprises in the supply chain. The research shows that the resource monopoly in the upper reaches of the supply chain determines its resource pricing mainly based on the profit level of the downstream producers, and the fundamental factor that affects the bargaining power in the downstream is its output instead of negotiating skills. The forerunner of price negotiation under the co-opetitive strategy will gain greater Yield and profit advantage. The simulation results show that compared with competitive strategy, the cooperative negotiation strategy can effectively improve the bargaining power of downstream manufacturing enterprises, reduce the resource pricing ability of upstream monopolists and effectively reduce the overall negotiation costs.