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具有组织承诺偏好的代理人不仅关心自身收入而且也关心组织利益,本文考虑组织承诺对参与人效用函数的影响,在此基础上拓展基本的委托—代理模型并归纳最优契约特征。研究表明,组织承诺本身是一个有效的激励因素,具有承诺偏好的员工比其他员工需要更少的薪酬激励,更小的工资差异可以激励高努力水平。在最优激励契约设计中承诺偏好与工资差异具有可替代性。当代理人承诺的增加完全依赖于委托人支持时,承诺并不有利于组织效率的提高。模型结论能更好地解释管理实践,尤其是非营利组织的管理实践,有助于管理者在受工资差异限制情况下进行激励机制设计,防止激励扭曲或过度激励引起的效率损失。
The agent with the organizational commitment preference not only cares about his own income but also cares about the organizational interests. This article considers the influence of organizational commitment on the participants’ utility function, and then expands the basic principal-agent model and summarizes the characteristics of the optimal contract. Research shows that organizational commitment is an effective incentive in and of itself. Employees with commitment preferences need less pay incentives than other employees, and smaller wage differentials can inspire higher levels of effort. In the design of the optimal incentive contract, there is an alternative promise commitment and wage difference. Commitments do not contribute to the improvement of organizational efficiency when the increase in agents’ commitment rests solely on the client’s support. Model conclusions can better explain management practices, especially non-profit organization management practices, and help managers to design incentive schemes subject to wage differentials to prevent loss of efficiency caused by distorted incentives or excessive incentives.