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恶性增资是一种常见的投资陷阱,学者们尚未就其产生原因给出普遍认可的理论解释。但一般认为,自辨理论、前景理论和委托代理理论是三种最主要的恶性增资解释理论。本文根据Staw提出的研究范式,通过角色扮演实验研究方法证明:在不存在委托代理关系的情况下,前景理论比自辨理论对决策者恶性增资行为具有更好的解释力。
Malignant replenishment is a common investment trap, and scholars have not given a universally accepted theoretical explanation for the causes. However, it is generally believed that self-discrimination theory, prospect theory, and principal-agent theory are the three most important explanations for malign investment. Based on the research paradigm put forward by Staw, this paper proves that through the role-playing experimental research method, if the principal-agent relationship does not exist, the prospect theory has a better explanatory power than the self-discriminating theory on the decision-maker’s malignant capital increase behavior.