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利用世界银行的中国企业调查数据(2005、2012),本文实证检验了中国企业在国内的市场扩张对产能过剩的影响,并结合地方政府行为与市场机制渠道考察了相关机理。研究发现:企业的属地经营加剧了产能过剩并使得中国的产能过剩具有省级市场的属地特征,企业在省际之间的市场扩张能够抑制产能过剩。考察相关机理后发现:中国在省级市场内部存在诱导企业过度进入并加剧投资的影响渠道,这使得市场内生的产能集中机制难以发挥作用;省际市场扩张能够强化企业竞争并影响其产能决策,市场内生的产能集中机制因而能够在全国发挥抑制产能过剩的作用。据此,通过以省级政府为重点完善顶层设计、鼓励企业在全国开展跨区经营、将全国性销售指标作为淘汰落后产能的重要依据等措施,完善中国产能过剩的治理政策。
Using the World Bank survey of Chinese enterprises (2005, 2012), this paper empirically tests the impact of Chinese enterprises’ market expansion on overcapacity in China and examines the relevant mechanisms in combination with the channels of local government behavior and market mechanism. It is found that the enterprises’ territorial management exacerbates the overcapacity and makes the overcapacity of China an attribute of the provincial market. The expansion of enterprises across provinces can restrain overcapacity. After examining the relevant mechanism, it is found that there exists a channel of influence that induces enterprises to over-enter and aggravate investment in the provincial market, which makes it difficult for endogenous capacity-concentration mechanism in the market to play a role. The expansion of the inter-provincial market can strengthen the competition of enterprises and affect their capacity decisions , The market endogenous capacity-building mechanism can thus play a role in restrain excess production capacity in the country. Based on this, we will improve the top-level design with the provincial government as the key point, encourage enterprises to carry out cross-border operations across the country, and take the national sales targets as an important basis for eliminating backward production capacity and other measures to improve China’s overcapacity control policies.