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为了分析政府不同补贴方式对再制造设计的影响,本文建立了原始制造商与再制造博弈模型。模型对比分析政府不同补贴方式对再制造设计努力程度、销售量、单位零售价格及销售利润的影响。研究结果表明:在原始制造商承担再制造设计费用,政府补贴给原始制造商不仅可以降低单位新产品与再制造产品的零售价格,增加新产品与再制造产品的销售量,还能增加原始制造商的销售利润和再制造设计的努力程度;在再制造商承担再制造设计费用时,政府补贴给再制造商虽然能降低单位新产品与再制造产品的零售价格,但是却减少了原始制造商的销售量与销售利润。
In order to analyze the effect of different government subsidies on remanufacturing design, this paper establishes a game model between original manufacturer and remanufacture. The model compares and analyzes the influence of different government subsidies on remanufacturing design efforts, sales volumes, unit retail prices and sales profits. The results of the study show that when the original manufacturer undertakes the remanufacturing design cost, the government subsidy to the original manufacturer can not only reduce the retail price of unit new products and remanufactured products, increase the sales volume of new products and remanufactured products, but also increase the cost of original manufacturing The sales profit of the retailer and the degree of remanufacturing design effort; while remanufacturers bear the cost of remanufacturing design, government subsidies to remanufacturers, while reducing the retail price of new and remanufactured products, reduce the original manufacturer Sales and sales profits.