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首先利用外部性理论,分析中国各省级政府对其管辖地方级保护区投入不足的主要原因是保护区的外部性问题,并建立模型定性的分析地方政府对保护区的投资水平是随着保护区外部性增大而减少。构建一种针对保护区的区际横向生态补偿框架,主要包括补偿主体、补偿客体、补偿工具、补偿标准和中央政府的监督。补偿框架的核心是补偿标准,通过设计一种动态税率,受体区域政府根据此税率征收本区域税收以补偿主体区域,从而达到整个社会效益最优。同时,通过构建博弈矩阵,证明了中央政府的监督会加强区际横向生态补偿机制的稳定性。
First of all, using the theory of externality, this paper analyzes the main reasons why the provincial governments in China under-administer local protected areas under their jurisdiction are the externalities of the protected areas and establish the qualitative analysis of the model. The level of investment in the protected areas by local governments is as protected District externalities increase and decrease. Construct an inter-regional horizontal ecological compensation framework for protected areas, including the main compensation, compensation objects, compensation tools, compensation standards and the supervision of the central government. The core of the compensation framework is the compensation standard. By designing a dynamic tax rate, the recipient region’s government levies taxes in the region according to this tax rate to compensate the main region, so as to achieve the best social benefits. At the same time, by constructing a game matrix, it is proved that the supervision of the central government will strengthen the stability of the inter-regional horizontal ecological compensation mechanism.