本文引证我国国有企业改革中的成功经验,运用公司理论作为分析工具对“社会公众是CPA的惟一委托人”的命题进行了分析。得出该命题不仅缺乏内在的逻辑性,并且在一定程度上影响了审计报告质量的结论。本文认为,为了提高审计工作质量,需要解决CPA的代理悖论,正确划分代理结构,并在此基础上开发基于CPA的激励机制。 This paper cites the successful experience of the reform of state-owned enterprises in our country and uses the theory of the company as an analytical tool to analyze the proposition that “the public is the only client of CPA”. It is concluded that the proposition not only lacks inherent logic, but also affects the quality of audit reports to a certain extent. This paper argues that in order to improve the quality of auditing work, it is necessary to solve the agent paradox of CPA, correctly divide the agent structure, and based on this, develop the CPA-based incentive mechanism.