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Kim Jong Un was always an unknown quantity. When the Workers’ Party of Korea chose the 28-year-old to lead North Korea on December 30， 2011， analysts across the world had a tough task trying to present accurate forecasts for the future of the Northeast Asian country. The global community had hoped that the young leader could bring positive change to North Korea， while also being acutely aware that his lack of governing experience， coupled with North Korea’s traditional military-first politics， could result in decisions that would upset stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Two years later， when Kim Jong Un held a memorial ceremony for his father—late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il， the confusion Pyongyang has brought to the world during the leadership transition has become more acute.
Mixed signals
Since taking office， Kim Jong Un has made progress in North Korea’s economic and social sectors. The new leader has attached greater importance to people’s livelihoods and taken inspection tours across the country. He has instructed North Korean enterprises to ensure production and the economy are developed according to global trends， in order to build a prosperous country. North Korea has instituted some economic reform measures， such as setting up economic zones at both central and local governmental levels and easing government control of enterprises and rural cooperatives.
Meanwhile， the radical foreign policy of Pyongyang， especially in the military and security fields， has made a strong impression on the outside world. For the past two years， Pyongyang has declared itself a nuclear country in its constitution， launched satellites， tested its nuclear weapons for the third time， closed the Kaesong Industrial Zone， announced its permanent withdrawal from the sixparty talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue， as well as having abolished the Korean Armistice Agreement. Though Pyongyang did not
wage a “real war，” its self-contradicting domestic and foreign policies continue to confuse the international community. Even China， which is believed to have kept a special relationship and direct communication channels open with North Korea， is not clear on Pyongyang’s direction. The above factors have directly led to a lack of confidence for all parties over the stability of the Korean Peninsula， as well as setting up dialogue with Pyongyang.
What has been particularly ominous is that the nature of the North Korean nuclear issue has changed after Kim Jong Un took power. Nuclear capability is no longer a bargaining chip for Pyongyang to use in exchange for security guarantees from other parties； instead， it is becoming a strategic deterrence that forces other parties to meet its demands. Such a change， which conforms to the fundamental interests of none of the parties， is not conducive to the lasting peace of the Korean Peninsula.
Washington and Seoul have turned a cold shoulder to the change in Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy. They have kept a low-level communication channel open with Pyongyang and refused to grant North Korea de facto nuclear power status. The two also proclaimed that only when Pyongyang takes steps to suspend or renounce its nuclear program， will they restart negotiations. During the past two years， frequent joint military drills by the United States and South Korea in waters adjacent to North Korea have seen tough words from Pyongyang， shocking the world.
In the meantime， while China and Russia have tried to urge the United States and South Korea to exercise restraint， they sided with the UN Security Council in condemning and applying sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear activities. Beijing and Moscow also made joint efforts to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program via political communication channels.
Forced with unprecedented international isolation， Pyongyang has adopted limited and hesitant alleviating measures with Washington， Seoul and Beijing since the spring of 2013. Celebrity U.S. basketball star Dennis Rodman has paid several visits to North Korea， his latest occurring on January 6. Kim Jong Un has met Rodman twice and asked him to send word to Washington that he hopes to receive a phone call from U.S. President Barack Obama and that he doesn’t like war.
In May 2013， Choe Ryong Hae， Director of the General Political Bureau of North Korea’s military， visited Beijing as the special envoy of Kim Jong Un. He delivered three messages to Chinese leaders： Pyongyang is willing to work together with China to promote the development of bilateral relations； it hopes to focus on developing the economy， improving people’s livelihoods and creating a peaceful external environment； and it is willing to take China’s advice to engage in dialogue with related parties. Five months later， Pyongyang suggested the comprehensive resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex to Seoul， before the two sides agreed to restart the industrial park as a pilot run. The outside world has noticed that Choe avoided the nuclear issue during his China visit. Some analysts said Pyongyang hopes to restart dialogue with other parties as a de facto nuclear weapon state and without any external preconditions on the North Korean Government. If the nuclear status of North Korea cannot be changed， what is the aim of negotiations without the objective of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula？
However， Pyongyang’s softening stance has halted the deterioration of the situation and helped to create room for a possible turnaround.
It has also shown the outside world that Kim Jong Un is aware of the importance of the China-North Korea relationship to the survival and development of North Korea. Restoring and improving bilateral relations would inevitably be Pyongyang’s first step in finding an exit strategy.
A new twist
Just when there was once again hope for the relaxation of the Korean Peninsula situation， the process was again interrupted by North Korea’s internal politics. The second most powerful political figure in Pyongyang， Jang Sung Taek， who was married to Kim Jong Un’s aunt， was removed from all posts and executed in early December 2013.
North Korea also staged pledges of loyalty to Kim Jong Un shortly afterward. It is very possible that there will be a new round of largescale personnel changes in the country at the beginning of 2014. The changing political landscape in North Korea has given the world with a greater sense of uncertainty about its foreign and domestic policies.
China， which considers the incident an internal affair of North Korea， took a cool-headed stance. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said China will stay committed to pushing the traditional friendship and cooperation with North Korea. During telephone calls with his Russian and U.S. counterparts， as well as the UN secretary general， Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China would continue to make joint efforts with all parties to promote the restart of the six-party talks as soon as possible. When interviewed by the media， Wang also said he hopes and believes that there would be no big changes in Pyongyang’s domestic and foreign policies.
Against this backdrop， technical-level exchanges between China and North Korea remain normal. Around the time when Pyongyang announced the removal of Jang， China and North Korea signed a cooperation agreement on building an economic zone on schedule. Exchanges between the two countries’ foreign ministries also proceeded as normal. Beijing’s calm response has shown its confidence over the China-North Korea relationship， as it is impossible for Pyongyang to handle its relations if China neglects geopolitical reality. Some analysts say after calming the waters of its domestic affairs， Pyongyang may try to arrange a visit to China by Kim Jong Un. Beijing might take some time to dwell on this issue however. Only when Beijing has confirmed that Pyongyang has no intention to challenge China’s bottom line on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and truly intends to shift its focus to developing its economy as well as improving people’s livelihoods， will its door be opened to Kim Jong Un.
For Beijing， finding a new balancing point between Pyongyang， Washington and Seoul on nuclear issue to promote the restart of the six-party talks will be another challenge.
North Korea has shown itself as unpredictable over the past two years. To restore its trust with the international community and open the door to dialogue once more will still take some time.
Two years later， when Kim Jong Un held a memorial ceremony for his father—late North Korean leader Kim Jong Il， the confusion Pyongyang has brought to the world during the leadership transition has become more acute.
Mixed signals
Since taking office， Kim Jong Un has made progress in North Korea’s economic and social sectors. The new leader has attached greater importance to people’s livelihoods and taken inspection tours across the country. He has instructed North Korean enterprises to ensure production and the economy are developed according to global trends， in order to build a prosperous country. North Korea has instituted some economic reform measures， such as setting up economic zones at both central and local governmental levels and easing government control of enterprises and rural cooperatives.
Meanwhile， the radical foreign policy of Pyongyang， especially in the military and security fields， has made a strong impression on the outside world. For the past two years， Pyongyang has declared itself a nuclear country in its constitution， launched satellites， tested its nuclear weapons for the third time， closed the Kaesong Industrial Zone， announced its permanent withdrawal from the sixparty talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue， as well as having abolished the Korean Armistice Agreement. Though Pyongyang did not
wage a “real war，” its self-contradicting domestic and foreign policies continue to confuse the international community. Even China， which is believed to have kept a special relationship and direct communication channels open with North Korea， is not clear on Pyongyang’s direction. The above factors have directly led to a lack of confidence for all parties over the stability of the Korean Peninsula， as well as setting up dialogue with Pyongyang.
What has been particularly ominous is that the nature of the North Korean nuclear issue has changed after Kim Jong Un took power. Nuclear capability is no longer a bargaining chip for Pyongyang to use in exchange for security guarantees from other parties； instead， it is becoming a strategic deterrence that forces other parties to meet its demands. Such a change， which conforms to the fundamental interests of none of the parties， is not conducive to the lasting peace of the Korean Peninsula.
Washington and Seoul have turned a cold shoulder to the change in Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy. They have kept a low-level communication channel open with Pyongyang and refused to grant North Korea de facto nuclear power status. The two also proclaimed that only when Pyongyang takes steps to suspend or renounce its nuclear program， will they restart negotiations. During the past two years， frequent joint military drills by the United States and South Korea in waters adjacent to North Korea have seen tough words from Pyongyang， shocking the world.
In the meantime， while China and Russia have tried to urge the United States and South Korea to exercise restraint， they sided with the UN Security Council in condemning and applying sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear activities. Beijing and Moscow also made joint efforts to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program via political communication channels.
Forced with unprecedented international isolation， Pyongyang has adopted limited and hesitant alleviating measures with Washington， Seoul and Beijing since the spring of 2013. Celebrity U.S. basketball star Dennis Rodman has paid several visits to North Korea， his latest occurring on January 6. Kim Jong Un has met Rodman twice and asked him to send word to Washington that he hopes to receive a phone call from U.S. President Barack Obama and that he doesn’t like war.
In May 2013， Choe Ryong Hae， Director of the General Political Bureau of North Korea’s military， visited Beijing as the special envoy of Kim Jong Un. He delivered three messages to Chinese leaders： Pyongyang is willing to work together with China to promote the development of bilateral relations； it hopes to focus on developing the economy， improving people’s livelihoods and creating a peaceful external environment； and it is willing to take China’s advice to engage in dialogue with related parties. Five months later， Pyongyang suggested the comprehensive resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex to Seoul， before the two sides agreed to restart the industrial park as a pilot run. The outside world has noticed that Choe avoided the nuclear issue during his China visit. Some analysts said Pyongyang hopes to restart dialogue with other parties as a de facto nuclear weapon state and without any external preconditions on the North Korean Government. If the nuclear status of North Korea cannot be changed， what is the aim of negotiations without the objective of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula？
However， Pyongyang’s softening stance has halted the deterioration of the situation and helped to create room for a possible turnaround.
It has also shown the outside world that Kim Jong Un is aware of the importance of the China-North Korea relationship to the survival and development of North Korea. Restoring and improving bilateral relations would inevitably be Pyongyang’s first step in finding an exit strategy.
A new twist
Just when there was once again hope for the relaxation of the Korean Peninsula situation， the process was again interrupted by North Korea’s internal politics. The second most powerful political figure in Pyongyang， Jang Sung Taek， who was married to Kim Jong Un’s aunt， was removed from all posts and executed in early December 2013.
North Korea also staged pledges of loyalty to Kim Jong Un shortly afterward. It is very possible that there will be a new round of largescale personnel changes in the country at the beginning of 2014. The changing political landscape in North Korea has given the world with a greater sense of uncertainty about its foreign and domestic policies.
China， which considers the incident an internal affair of North Korea， took a cool-headed stance. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said China will stay committed to pushing the traditional friendship and cooperation with North Korea. During telephone calls with his Russian and U.S. counterparts， as well as the UN secretary general， Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China would continue to make joint efforts with all parties to promote the restart of the six-party talks as soon as possible. When interviewed by the media， Wang also said he hopes and believes that there would be no big changes in Pyongyang’s domestic and foreign policies.
Against this backdrop， technical-level exchanges between China and North Korea remain normal. Around the time when Pyongyang announced the removal of Jang， China and North Korea signed a cooperation agreement on building an economic zone on schedule. Exchanges between the two countries’ foreign ministries also proceeded as normal. Beijing’s calm response has shown its confidence over the China-North Korea relationship， as it is impossible for Pyongyang to handle its relations if China neglects geopolitical reality. Some analysts say after calming the waters of its domestic affairs， Pyongyang may try to arrange a visit to China by Kim Jong Un. Beijing might take some time to dwell on this issue however. Only when Beijing has confirmed that Pyongyang has no intention to challenge China’s bottom line on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and truly intends to shift its focus to developing its economy as well as improving people’s livelihoods， will its door be opened to Kim Jong Un.
For Beijing， finding a new balancing point between Pyongyang， Washington and Seoul on nuclear issue to promote the restart of the six-party talks will be another challenge.
North Korea has shown itself as unpredictable over the past two years. To restore its trust with the international community and open the door to dialogue once more will still take some time.