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企业决策行为有时会受到个人因素影响,委托代理问题的存在使得管理层不愿承担风险。文章以沪深A股上市公司2013-2015年的数据作为样本,使用stata14.0对管理层的激励是否影响企业风险承担关系进行研究。研究结果发现:(1)管理层薪酬与企业风险承担水平正相关;(2)管理层持股与企业风险承担水平正相关。
Corporate decision-making behavior is sometimes affected by personal factors, the existence of the commission agent problem makes management unwilling to take risks. The article takes the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2015 as a sample and uses stata14.0 to study whether the management incentive affects the enterprise risk appetite. The findings are as follows: (1) Management compensation is positively correlated with the level of corporate risk taking; (2) Management shareholding is positively correlated with the level of corporate risk taking.