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当前,“主制造商-供应商”的协同合作模式成为复杂产品的主流生产模式,与传统的制造商供应商合作激励相比,该合作模式更关注供应商的努力水平和长期战略合作,其努力程度决定了复杂产品的生产质量与效率。为激励供应商的努力合作,本文设计努力程度参数,提出了主制造商分摊供应商努力成本的激励策略,建立了基于努力程度的最优成本分摊模型,研究了Nash均衡和Stackelberg均衡两种结构下的激励模式,给出该激励模式下的主制造商分摊供应商研制成本的最优比例、最优努力水平和最优收益。研究结果表明,当供应商的努力程度大于等于努力阀值时,主制造商需分担供应商的努力成本,成本分担大小与供应商努力程度的平方成正比,且受单位收益系数和努力程度收益影响系数的影响。同时,研究表明,在主制造商供应商的协同合作机制中,主从关系的Stackelberg博弈收益优于Nash均衡收益,应用分析进一步表明,主制造商通过分担供应商努力成本的激励措施可以有效地激励供应商的努力程度,实现在主制造商供应商利益均增长的情况下,达到帕累托改进。本文系统地揭示了主制造商激励供应商的最优成本分担问题,为复杂产品主制造商供应商的长期战略合作激励策略制定提供决策依据。
At present, the “master manufacturer-supplier” synergy mode becomes the mainstream mode of production of complex products. Compared with the incentive of traditional manufacturer suppliers, the cooperation mode is more concerned with the level of supplier’s efforts and long-term strategic cooperation , The degree of effort determines the quality of production and efficiency of complex products. In order to motivate the supplier’s cooperation, this paper designs effort parameters, proposes the incentive strategy for the main manufacturer to share the effort cost of the supplier, sets up the optimal cost allocation model based on the degree of effort, studies the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium Under the incentive model, the optimal ratio, the optimal level of effort and the optimal return of the main manufacturer’s share of the supplier’s development cost under this incentive model are given. The results show that when the supplier’s effort is greater than or equal to the effort threshold, the main manufacturer needs to share the effort cost of the supplier, which is directly proportional to the square of the effort of the supplier and is affected by the unit income coefficient and the effort level Effect of influence coefficient. At the same time, the research shows that Stackelberg game yield of master-slave relationship is superior to Nash equilibrium return in the cooperation mechanism of master manufacturer’s suppliers. Application analysis further shows that master manufacturer’s incentive to share supplier’s effort cost can be effectively Stimulate supplier efforts to achieve Pareto improvement with the benefit of the main manufacturer’s suppliers both increasing. This paper systematically reveals that the main manufacturer motivates the optimal cost-sharing of suppliers, and provides the decision-making basis for the long-term strategic cooperation incentive strategies of the main manufacturer of complex products.