央行决定,从3月17日起对商业银行自营性个人住房贷款政策进行两项调整。房贷政策的第一项调整,是对房地产价格上涨过快的城市或地区,个人住房贷款最低首付款比例可由现行的20%提高到30%。具体调整的城市或地区,可由商业银行法人依据国家有关部门公布的各地房地产价格涨幅自行确定,不搞一刀切。第二项调整为将现行住房贷款优惠利率回归到同期贷款利率水平,实行下限管理。下限利率水平为相应期限档次贷款基准利率的0.9倍,商业银行法人可根据具体情况自主确定利率水平和内部定价规则。以5年期以上个人住房贷款为例,其利率下限为贷款基准利率6.12%的0.9倍,即5.51%,比现行优惠利率5.31%高出了0.2个百分点。在个人住房信贷政策作出调整后,个人住房公积金贷款利率也相应微幅上调。个人住房公积金贷款利率上调0.18个百分点。此政策一经出笼,自然引起各界强烈反响。对此央行明确表示:本次政策调整有利于从需求方对未来资金价格形成较合理的预期。对央行的这一留有足够想象空间的政策意图如何理解,我们听到的既有来自央行自身的解释,还包括外界不同版本的揣测。本期专题也试图透过多个视角对这一政策做出解析梳理。 The central bank decided that from March 17, two adjustments should be made to the self-operated personal housing loan policy of commercial banks. The first adjustment of the mortgage policy is for cities or areas where real estate prices have risen too fast. The minimum down payment for individual housing loans can be raised from the current 20% to 30%. The specific adjustment of the city or region may be determined by the commercial bank legal person according to the real estate price increase of all localities promulgated by the relevant state departments, and will not pursue a one-size-fits-all approach. The second adjustment for the current home loan preferential interest rates back to the same period lending rates, the implementation of minimum management. The minimum interest rate level is 0.9 times of the benchmark interest rate of the corresponding term loans, and the commercial bank legal person can independently determine the interest rate level and the internal pricing rules according to the specific conditions. Take individual housing loans of more than 5 years as an example. The lower limit of interest rate is 0.9 times of the benchmark lending rate of 6.12%, or 5.51%, 0.2 percentage points higher than the current preferential interest rate of 5.31%. After making adjustments to the personal housing credit policy, personal housing provident fund loan rates also increased slightly correspondingly. Personal housing accumulation fund loan interest rates increased 0.18 percentage points. Once this policy comes out, it naturally arouses strong repercussions from all walks of life. The central bank made it clear that: This policy adjustment is conducive to demand from the demand side for the formation of more reasonable expectations of the price of funds. What we are hearing about this central bank’s policy of leaving enough room to imagine is what we hear from both the central bank’s own explanation and different versions of the speculation. This issue also attempts to analyze this policy through multiple perspectives.