根据一种正统观点,知觉信念由知觉经验所引起,而戴维森众所周知地对这一观点提出了挑战,即经验在认识当中究竟起着什么作用。而对经验的认知意义判断则有三种不同的观点:传统观点、现代观点和后现代观点,分别是对于戴维森挑战的不同回应。在对三种观点分别进行分析后,进而论证了正统图景的看法无法解释经验何以具有认识论意义上的重要性。而在标准图景的预设下,认为戴维森挑战并没有一个满意的答案。解决方法则是拒斥这个预设,特别是拒斥经验——信念的突触。传统图景的基础问题是大多数经验能做的是使能知识。这里所捍卫的对立观点则认为,经验能做得更多——当一切进行顺利的时候,它是一种在“好例子”中知道的方式。 According to one orthodox view, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experience, and Davidson is known to pose a challenge to this view of the role that experience plays in understanding. However, there are three different viewpoints on the cognitive significance of experience: traditional view, modern view and post-modern view, respectively, different responses to Davidson’s challenge. After analyzing each of the three perspectives, it is argued that the orthodox picture does not explain the importance of experience in an epistemological sense. In the standard picture of the default, Davidson challenge and do not think there is a satisfactory answer. The solution is to reject this presupposition, especially the rejection of experience-belief synapses. The basic problem with traditional landscapes is that most of the experience can be done by enabling knowledge. The antithesis here defended was that experience could do more - a way of knowing in “good examples” when everything went well.