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格林在实验的基础上得出了义务论的判断倾向于由情感所驱动,后果论的判断倾向于由认知过程所驱动的结论,并由此认为康德的义务论可能是个错误。然而格林对康德的批评选错了对象。格林的实验可以为反对道德理性主义提供依据。但是,他在义务论与情感驱动、后果论与认知驱动之间所建立的联系是缺乏依据的,因为他的实验并不能在义务论与情感驱动、后果论与认知过程之间建立起必然联系。而且,即便格林的实验能说明义务论的一些判断是出于情感的,也不能对康德的义务论构成挑战。
Based on the experiment, Green concluded that the judgment of obligation theory tends to be driven by emotion, and the judgment of consequence theory tends to be driven by the cognitive process. Therefore, Kant’s obligation theory may be a mistake. However, Green’s critique of Kant picked the wrong target. Green’s experiment can provide a basis for opposing moral rationalism. However, his connection between obligations and emotion-driven, consequences and cognitive-driven is scanty because his experiments can not be established between obligations and emotions, consequences and cognitive processes Inevitably contact. And even if Green’s experiments show that some of the judgments of voluntary doctrine are emotionally charged, they can not challenge Kant’s obligation.