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对金融机构而言,增加利润最简单快捷的办法就是提高杠杆率,所以在风险和杠杆率的问题上,监管者与金融机构之间总是存在着分歧;很多人认为2008年的金融危机是因为不完善的经理人薪酬制度导致的。但是,现在有越来越多的证据表明,其实股东是默许经理人的薪酬制度的,并以此诱使经理人接受高风险和高杠杆率。因此,来自股东的压力才是导致系统重要性金融机构破产的真正原因。那么怎样才能防止这样的事件再次发生呢?多德弗兰克法案的做法主要是依靠预防性监管,但本文认为,金融监管的政治经济学已经表明,严格监管之后必然又是宽松监管(“监管正弦曲线”)。更重要的是,多德弗兰克法案大大限制了监管者救助危机金融机构的权力,而主要是将其纳入联邦储蓄保险公司的强制清算程序。本文认为,对于有危机但不至破产的金融机构而言,强制清算并不是最好的办法,有更好的选择。本文建议使用或有资本制度,通过或有资本制度,大型金融机构相当比例的债券,在预先约定的条件下会转化为股票。但是,与以往有关或有资本的观点不同的是,本文主张转化后的股权是具有投票权的非转化高级累积优先股。这样设计的原因在于,创造一种天然反对风险而又有投票权的股东,以此来对抗追求高风险、高杠杆率的普通股股东,但是只有在金融机构进入“濒临破产”的最后阶段,才能赋予他们投票权。本文讨论的问题主要包括:第一,或有资本证券的设计;第二,最近欧洲发行类似证券的经验介绍;第三,或有资本证券在税收等方面存在的障碍;第四,或有资本制度国际趋同的可能性;第五,美国联邦储备委员会实施或有资本制度的现有职权。或有资本的时代虽然已经到来,但是哪种制度设计才是最优的,这个问题仍有待讨论。
For financial institutions, the simplest and fastest way to increase profits is to increase the leverage ratio. Therefore, there are always differences between regulators and financial institutions on the issues of risk and leverage. Many people think that the financial crisis in 2008 was Due to imperfect manager compensation system. However, there is growing evidence that shareholders in fact acquiesce in the manager’s compensation system and thus induce managers to accept high risk and high leverage. Therefore, the pressure from shareholders is the real cause of bankruptcy of systemically important financial institutions. How do we prevent such an incident from happening again? The Dodd-Frank Act mainly relies on preventive regulation, but this article argues that the political economy of financial regulation has shown that regulation is necessarily followed by loose regulation after strict supervision curve"). More importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act substantially limits the regulator’s power to rescue financial institutions in crisis, and primarily incorporates them into the mandatory liquidation process of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This article argues that compulsory liquidation is not the best solution for financial institutions that are in crisis but not bankrupt, and that they have a better choice. This article suggests using a capital-based system that has a capital structure or a large proportion of bonds in large financial institutions that are converted into stocks under pre-agreed conditions. However, different from previous capital-related opinions, this paper argues that the converted equity is a non-converted senior accumulative preference share with voting rights. The reason for this design is to create a shareholder with natural risk-taking and voting rights to combat the common stock shareholders who pursue high risk and high leverage, but only at the end of the financial institution’s entry into bankruptcy Stage, in order to give them the right to vote. The issues discussed in this paper mainly include: first, the design of contingent capital securities; second, the recent introduction of the experience of similar securities in Europe; third, the existence of obstacles in the taxation of capital securities; and fourth, contingent capital Institutional possibility of international convergence; fifth, the US Federal Reserve Commission to implement or have the existing powers of the capital system. Although the era of capital or capital has arrived, what kind of system design is the best? This issue remains to be discussed.