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本文以2000～2006年沪、深A股上市企业为样本,借鉴罗伊秋哈里(Roychowdhury,2006)的真实盈余管理评价模型,分析了我国上市企业最高管理者临变更时的盈余管理模式。研究结果发现,总经理变更企业的变更前一年度的经营活动现金流量显著低于总经理留任企业,生产成本显著高于总经理留任企业,反映上市公司总经理在任期最后一年通过异常促销或过度生产等方式操控利润。
This paper takes Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2000 to 2006 as a sample, and analyzes the real-earnings management model of the top managers of listed companies in China when they refer to Roychowdhury (2006)’s real earnings management evaluation model. The results of the study found that the cash flow from operating activities of the general manager of changing the company’s business before the change was significantly lower than that of the general manager. The production cost was significantly higher than that of the general manager, indicating that the general manager of the listed company passed an abnormal promotion in the last year of his tenure. Over-production and other ways to manipulate profits.