与传统财政分权理论相比,中国“自上而下”的财政分权强调中央政府对资源的掌握和在宏观调控中的主导作用。地方政府则在很大程度上作为中央政府的代理人出现,其提供公共服务的成本和收益之间缺乏必要的联系。在这种情况下,有效的分权必须首先明确中央政府的目标,然后依此建立能够取得预期结果的激励机制,包括完善转移支付体系和优化地方政府收入结构。 Compared with the traditional fiscal decentralization theory, the fiscal decentralization in China underlines the central government’s mastery of resources and its leading role in macro-control. Local government, to a large extent, acts as an agent of the central government and lacks the necessary link between the costs and benefits of providing public services. Under such circumstances, the effective decentralization must first clear the objectives of the central government and then set up an incentive mechanism that can achieve the expected results, including improving the transfer payment system and optimizing the revenue structure of local governments.