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借鉴哈耶克社会秩序二元观的思想,构建信任品生产企业的演化博弈模型,分析解释内部规则和外部规则作用下企业生产行为的演化逻辑。研究结果表明:在仅有内部规则作用下信任品企业生产行为的自发演化过程中,当高质量信任品的生产成本过高时,市场上的企业最终都会选择生产低质量信任品;当高质量信任品的生产成本适中时,最终选择生产低质量信任品的企业比例取决于初始阶段的市场情况;当高质量信任品的生产成本较低时,企业最终都会选择生产高质量信任品。同时,“幼稚型”消费者比例和不公平厌恶系数也会影响市场演化的结果。在质量认证制度作为外部规则介入市场后,市场演化的结果将受到认证精确度的影响,精确度高的认证制度有利于市场向良性状态演化,而精确度低的认证制度将阻碍市场向良性状态演化。
Drawing on the dualistic view of Hayek’s social order, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of trustworthy manufacturing enterprises, and analyzes and explains the evolutionary logic of firm’s production behavior under internal rules and external rules. The results show that in the process of spontaneous evolution of the trustworthy enterprise’s production behavior under the influence of internal rules, the enterprises in the market will eventually choose to produce low-quality trustworthy goods when the production cost of high-quality trustworthy goods is too high. When high quality When the production cost of trustworthy goods is modest, the proportion of enterprises that ultimately choose to produce low-quality trustworthiness products depends on the initial market conditions. When the production costs of high-quality trustworthy goods are low, the enterprises will eventually choose to produce high-quality trustworthy goods. At the same time, the “naive” proportion of consumers and unfair aversion factors also affect the outcome of market evolution. After the quality certification system is introduced into the market as an external rule, the result of the market evolution will be affected by the accuracy of the certification. A high-precision certification system will help the market evolve to a benign condition. A less accurate certification system will prevent the market from moving towards a benign condition evolution.