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次贷危机爆发之后、特别是雷曼破产后,各国政府推出了许多政策措施,目的在于重建市场信心,最明显的途径是向系统重要银行提供正式或非正式的担保。但当银行负债不得不成为政府的或有负债时,就会彻底改变市场对政府自身信用的评价。在希腊等体质较弱的欧洲外围国家,会把政府和银行一道带入恶性循环。不过,欧元的结构比通常理解的更为坚固,脱离欧元是一种代价昂贵的违约方式,相信这是最不可能发生的;相比之下,政府债务重组对经济的负面影响较小,因而更可能被采用。
Subsequent to the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis, especially after Lehman went bankrupt, governments introduced many policy measures aimed at rebuilding market confidence, most obviously by providing formal or informal guarantees to key banking systems. However, when a bank’s debt has to become a government contingent liability, it will completely change the market’s assessment of the government’s own credit. In Greece and other weaker peripheral European countries, the government and banks will be put together in a vicious circle. However, the structure of the euro is stronger than generally understood and the departure from the euro is a costly default, believing it is the least likely to happen; in contrast, the negative impact of government debt restructuring on the economy is small and thus More likely to be adopted.