金融危机过后人们反思,危机是金融公司追求最大利益与金融系统追求安全稳定相博弈的时段性结果。董事决策是诱发金融系统风险的导火索。文章分析经济法律规制董事受信义务的动因,设定董事受信义务的公私法分配,剖析新设监管范式的法律效果,力图遏制董事不顾金融系统性风险追求个人或公司利益最大的欲望,以期达到防范金融系统性风险的目的。 After the financial crisis, people think about themselves. The crisis is a time-critical result of the pursuit of the best interests of financial companies and the pursuit of security and stability by the financial system. Decision-making by directors is a trigger for the risk of the financial system. This article analyzes the motivation of economic law to regulate the fiduciary duties of directors, sets up the distribution of public and private law of fiduciary duties of directors, analyzes the legal effect of the new regulatory model, tries to curb the desire of directors to pursue the most interests of individuals or companies regardless of financial systemic risk, The purpose of financial systemic risk.