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食药监管领域的贪贿犯罪往往是贪贿犯罪的重灾区,时常存在“谁来监督监督者”的尴尬局面。同时该监管领域的贪贿犯罪人与检察机关之间由于信息不对称等原因,存在着博弈的关系。根据博弈论中的策略模型分析犯罪人和检察机关在采取策略时的不同成本收益分析,可以找出犯罪人进行犯罪的临界值,以分析犯罪成本、监察行为和犯罪收益等因素影响犯罪人从事贪贿犯罪的概率,探索食品监管领域贪贿犯罪发生的深层次原因,进而提出相应的防范对策。
The crime of corruption in the field of food and drug supervision is often the hardest hit by crime of bribery, and often there is an embarrassing situation where “whoever supervises the supervisor”. At the same time, due to the information asymmetry between prosecutors and bribe criminals in the regulatory field, there exists a game relationship. According to the strategic model in game theory, the analysis of different costs and benefits of criminals and procuratorial agencies when adopting tactics can find out the critical value of criminals to conduct crime, analyze the cost of criminals, supervise behaviors and proceeds of criminals, The probability of bribery crime to explore the deep-rooted causes of the crime of bribery in the field of food regulation, and then put forward corresponding preventive measures.