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“多个”维特根斯坦观念对理解维特根斯坦的哲学会造成诸多误解和争论。文章主要关注哈克和莫亚-夏洛克有关“第三阶段的维特根斯坦”之争。基于哈克的整体式观点,主要反驳“多个”维特根斯坦概念:它们自身就存在着各种张力。“多个”维特根斯坦像“数维特根斯坦”游戏,它形成的原因是,学界普遍存在的对维特根斯坦哲学阶段的分期、阐释者对其不同理解以及“三个维特根斯坦学派”和“三种阐释方法”的争论。最后,提出“一个维特根斯坦”及其哲学延续性观念,并指出魏斯曼的有阐释著作在理解“中期”维特根斯坦哲学工作中的重要性。
“Many ” The Wittgenstein concept creates many misunderstandings and controversies in understanding Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The article focuses mainly on Huck and Moya-Shylock’s debate about Wittgenstein in the third stage. Based on Huck’s holistic point of view, the main refutation of the “multiple” Wittgenstein concept is that there are tensions of their own. The reason why Wittgenstein was like Wittgenstein was that the ubiquitous staging of Wittgenstein’s philosophical stage, interpretations of his different interpretations, and the three “ Wittgenstein School ”and “ three interpretation methods ”argument. Finally, we propose “a Wittgenstein” and its philosophical continuity concept and point out the importance of Weisman’s interpretation of his work in understanding “mid” Wittgenstein’s philosophical work.