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风险投资体系由风险投资者、风险投资机构、风险企业和一些中介机构组成,其中前三者是主体,并且两两之间构成了委托代理关系,其中最重要的是第一重委托代理关系。由于风险投资者和风险资本家之间信息的不对称形成了逆向选择和道德风险的问题,加大了代理成本。本文将探讨如何通过合理安排风险投资机构的财务治理结构来解决第一重委托代理关系中的逆向选择和道德风险。
The venture capital system is composed of risk investors, venture capital institutions, risk companies and some intermediary agencies. The first three of them are the main bodies, and the two constitute the principal-agent relationship. The most important of these is the first principal-agent relationship. Since the asymmetry of information between venture investors and venture capitalists has formed problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, agency costs have increased. This article will discuss how to solve the adverse selection and moral hazard in the first principal-agent relationship by rationalizing the financial governance structure of venture capital institutions.