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研究逆向选择下,委托人通过信号辅助改善信息结构后所面临的代理人信息租金抽取与配置效率的均衡决策问题。首先,分析讨论了完全信息下的最优契约和逆向选择下先验分布基础上的次优契约;之后,基于贝叶斯规则,将与代理人相关的外部信号及信号搜集成本纳入委托人的最优规划问题,对后验分布下的均衡变动进行了分析,给出了信号搜集成本可行预算集。研究表明,贝叶斯方法有利于委托人在信息租金与效率扭曲冲突中优化决策,为复杂环境下的实务契约设计逼近激励相容契约提供了量化参考依据。
Under adverse selection, the problem of equilibrium decision-making of agent information rent extraction and configuration efficiency faced by the principal after the information aids are improved by signal assistance. First, the optimal contract under complete information and the suboptimal contract based on the prior distribution under adverse selection are analyzed and discussed. Then, based on the Bayesian rule, the external signals and signal collection costs related to the agent are included in the principal Optimal planning problem, the equilibrium changes under the posterior distribution are analyzed, and the feasible budget set of the signal acquisition cost is given. The research shows that the Bayesian method is good for the principal to optimize the decision-making in the conflict between the information rent and the efficiency, and provides the quantitative reference for the design of practical contracts approaching the incentive compatibility in the complex environment.