在现实中,虽说信息量可以选择,但绝非没有成本。如果采购方花费更多的人力物力来监督供应商的行动的话,当可获得更多的关于供应商行动的信息,从而加强对供应商的激励和监督。本文旨在说明,在不同的合同形式下,政府采购单位应如何选择自己的监督量才能最大化自己的利益。 In reality, although the amount of information can be chosen, there is absolutely no cost. If the purchaser spends more manpower and resources to supervise the supplier’s actions, more information about the supplier’s actions can be obtained, so as to strengthen the supplier’s incentive and supervision. The purpose of this article is to show how, under different contractual forms, government procurement units should maximize their own interests by selecting their own oversight.