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在本文中,我们建立了一个无限期的模型来分析社会网络对非正规金融市场的影响。通过引入一个对借款方不支付还款的社会惩罚函数,我们的模型解释了存在社会网络作用时,在没有抵押品和法律执行力的情况下非正规金融市场如何运行。结论表明,社会关系网络扩大了信贷和还款额度,提升了贷款人的利润和社会总体福利,但是对借款人的效用是不确定的。我们还证明了此无限期信贷模型下对称并且稳定均衡的存在性。
In this paper, we set up an indefinite model to analyze the impact of social networks on informal financial markets. By introducing a social penalty function that does not pay repayments to borrowers, our model explains how informal financial markets operate without social securities and law enforcement in the presence of social networks. The conclusion shows that the social network has expanded the credit and repayment quota, raised the profit of the lender and the overall social welfare, but the utility of the borrower is uncertain. We also demonstrate the existence of a symmetric and stable equilibrium under this indefinite credit model.