研究了制造商的生产成本增加量为对称信息和非对称信息条件下的收入共享契约,结果表明:在对称信息条件下,收入共享契约可以达到系统协调,但在非对称信息条件下,为了激励制造商,销售商不得不对制造商的生产成本增加量的不可观测性付出成本,导致利润下降,而制造商由于拥有私有信息使得利润增加,整个供应链系统不能实现协调最优,只能得到具有帕累托改善的次优结果.最后通过算例进行了说明. The results show that under the condition of symmetric information, revenue sharing contract can achieve system coordination, but under the condition of asymmetric information, in order to stimulate Manufacturers and sellers have to pay the cost of the manufacturer’s increase in the cost of non-observable, resulting in declining profits, and manufacturers because of proprietary information makes the profit increase, the entire supply chain system can not achieve optimal coordination, can only be obtained with Pareto improved suboptimal results.At last, an example is given.