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国会两院制是近代中国宪法史上一个重要、但却容易被忽视的问题。国会两院的权力关系与单一制或联邦制的国家结构形式密切相关;而由两院的对立所造成的国会运作失灵,还给总统权力的扩张制造了可乘之机,甚至可能造成政体形式由议会制转向总统制。近代中国的国会体制经历了辛亥革命之初参议院一院制、民国北京政府前十年对称式两院制、1923年《中华民国宪法》下的非对称式两院制、南京国民政府训政时期的立法院一院制与1946年《中华民国宪法》下的“一个半议院”体制等多个阶段。总的来说,近代中国制宪者能够在参众两院于政治实践中尚未发生严重对立的情况下,摈弃对称式两院制;进而在中西结合的五权宪法新范式下,设计出类似阿克曼所谓“一个半议院”的模式;并且在单一制国家结构的基础上,通过“一个半议院”的模式兼容了联邦制的因子。这些都是非常有益的尝试。
The two chambers in Congress are an important but easily overlooked issue in the history of modern China. The power relations between the two houses of Congress are closely related to the form of state structure of unitary or federalism. The failure of parliamentary operation caused by the confrontation between the two houses also creates an opportunity for the expansion of presidential power and may even result in a form of polity From parliamentary system to presidential system. In modern China, the parliamentary system underwent the first phase of the Revolutionary Chamber of Deputies in the Revolution of 1911, the two-state symmetry system in the first ten years of the Peking government, the asymmetric two-state system in the Constitution of the Republic of China in 1923, the one-court system of the Legislative Yuan of the National Government of Nanjing in 1946 The “One and a Half House” system under the “ROC Constitution” and other phases. In general, the modern Chinese constitutionalists can abandon the symmetrical bicameral system under the condition that there is no serious confrontation between the House and the House in the political practice. Then, under the new paradigm of the Five-Power Constitution combined by China and the West, Man said the so-called “one-and-a-half-house” model; and on the basis of the unitary state structure, the “one and a half” model is compatible with the federalism. These are very useful attempts.