在中国,不当解雇引起的赔偿金争议日益增多。本文首先对美、英、法、德四国相关规制进行比较研究,分析并总结出不当解雇赔偿需经劳雇双方博弈来确定赔偿责任和赔偿标准的内在运行机制。以诺基亚(苏州)不当解雇赔偿案例为引导,基于一个合作博弈分析,得出赔偿金数额的大小受劳雇双方赔偿金谈判的风险偏好影响等结论。 In China, there is increasing controversy over damages caused by improper dismissals. This article first makes a comparative study of the relevant regulations in the United States, Britain, France and Germany, analyzes and summarizes the inherent operating mechanism of determining compensation liability and compensation standard through the game between employers and employees in the event of improper dismissal. Taking the case of Nokia (Suzhou) improper dismissal as a guide, based on a cooperative game analysis, it concludes that the amount of the compensation is influenced by the risk appetite of the compensation negotiation between employers and employees.