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竞争对政府约束的强化是有条件的。当地区同时运用税收和公共服务两种政策工具进行竞争时,两者之间的替代和互补关系取决于该地区的资源禀赋结构。资源禀赋充裕时,税收竞争强度的增大,能激励地方政府供给更多的公共服务;而资源禀赋相对稀缺时,税收竞争强度的增大,反而可能刺激地方政府产生更多的在职消费。文章通过对中国省级水平的面板数据进行了经验实证,发现其经验结果支持上面的命题。
The reinforcement of the government’s restraint by competition is conditional. When the region uses both tax and public service policy tools to compete, the substitution and complementarity between the two depends on the region’s resource endowment structure. When the resource endowment is abundant, the intensification of tax competition can encourage local governments to provide more public services. When the resource endowment is relatively scarce, the intensification of tax competition may stimulate local governments to generate more on-the-job consumption. The paper empirically tests panel data at the provincial level in China and finds that the empirical results support the above propositions.