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在1972年《命名与必然性》的演讲中,作者提出了直接指称论的观点:名字的语义学内容仅仅就是所指称的对象。一般认为,如果接受直接指称论就必然导致信念之谜。因为,假如专名的语义学内容仅仅就是所指称的对象,那么两个共指称的专名,比如“Cicero”(“西塞罗”)和“Tully”(“图利”),就应该在信念语境中可以替换。但这似乎是错误的,因为,似乎“琼斯相信西塞罗是秃子但不相信图利是秃子”可以是真的,而倘若作替换,就会得出矛盾。在本文中,作者试图论证:实际上导致信念之谜的乃是两个更为基本的原则,即去引号原则和翻译原则;不能把信念之谜的产生归咎于直接指称论。通过这种间接论证,作者认为,直接指称论没有被信念之谜难题驳倒,它还是能够获得辩护的。
In his 1972 Naming and Necessity speech, the author put forward the view of direct allegation: the semantic content of the name is merely the object of the allegation. It is generally accepted that accepting the direct reference theory necessarily leads to the mystery of faith. Because, if the semantic content of the proper name is merely the object of the allegation, then two co-alleged names, such as “Cicero” (“Cicero”) and “Tully” (“ Lee ”), it should be replaced in the context of belief. But that seems to be wrong, because, it seems, “Jones can believe Cicero is Baldy but does not believe Tuli is Baldy” can be true, and if it is replaced, a contradiction arises. In this paper, the author attempts to argue that the two most basic principles that actually lead to the puzzle of belief are the principle of quotation marks and the principle of translation; the production of the puzzle of belief can not be attributed to the theory of direct reference. Through this indirect argument, the author argues that the direct allegation theory can not be rebutted by the puzzle of conviction, and it can still be defended.