经过两年的治理整顿,我国经济发展中的总量矛盾得到很大缓解。可是结构问题解决得并不理想。究其原因,我认为是企业改革不到位,或者说不配套,影响了计划调节和市场调节的效应。扩权让利改革,使企业有了接受市场信号进行自主经营的动力机制,但是现行的国有资产的产权关系,又使企业缺乏应有的约束机制。在这种条件下,市场的调节作用是倾斜的,对企业的利益约束是不对称的。就是说,市场环境对企业有利时,企业则接受市场信号的调节,产生合理的市场行为,市场调节起作用;反之,对企业不利时,便出现一种排斥市场调节的企业行为,甚至是逆市场行为。从微观基础构造上就限制了市场机制对产业结构的调节作用。不仅如此,财政的分灶吃饭和地方分权。又使企业的产权关系同行政权力混淆,从而导致封闭性的市场割据。在当前市场疲软的形势下,行政性的市场管理和地方割据就更加严重,必然阻碍市场机制对产业结 After two years of governance and rectification, the total contradiction in China’s economic development has been greatly eased. However, the structural problem was not solved satisfactorily. The reason for this is that I believe that the reform of the enterprise is not in place or that it is not matched, which has affected the effect of planning adjustment and market regulation. Enlargement of power and profit-sharing reforms have enabled companies to receive market signals to conduct their own operations. However, the current ownership of state-owned assets has caused companies to lack the necessary restraint mechanisms. Under such conditions, the market’s regulatory role is tilted, and the interests of enterprises are asymmetric. That is to say, when the market environment is favorable to the enterprise, the enterprise will accept the adjustment of market signals, produce reasonable market behavior, and market regulation will work. On the contrary, when it is unfavorable to the enterprise, there will be a kind of corporate behavior that excludes market regulation, even conversely. Market behavior. From the microscopic foundation structure, the market mechanism’s adjustment to the industrial structure is limited. Not only that, but also fiscal divisions and decentralization. It also confused the corporate property rights with the administrative power, resulting in a closed market segmentation. In the current situation of a weak market, administrative market management and local separatism will become even more serious, and it will inevitably hinder the market mechanism to industrial relations.