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作者以西非国家经济共同体(西共体)为例,对戴维.贝尔斯等提出的“特惠贸易安排的和平效应源于制度层面而非经济一体化”的观点进行了修正,并提出了特惠贸易安排产生和平效应的限制条件。从西共体的历史过程来看,在同一制度框架内既有加纳与多哥之间冲突缓和的案例,也有马里与布基纳法索、塞内加尔与毛里塔尼亚这两组冲突升级的案例,这充分说明贸易制度安排的和平效应产生于制度框架之外。通过求同和求异法对上述三组冲突案例的比较分析发现:当冲突涉及两国的核心利益和强大的国内政治压力时,冲突就会升级,特惠贸易安排的和平效应不发挥作用;反之,只有当冲突不涉及两国的核心利益并且冲突国之间存在经济相互依存时,特惠贸易安排的和平效应才能够显现。
Taking the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as an example, the author amends the view that the “peace effect of preferential trading arrangements” proposed by David Baerls et al. Originated from the institutional level rather than the economic integration, and proposed Restrictions on the effects of peace on preferential trade arrangements. Judging from the historical process of the ECOWAS, there are two cases of conflict mitigation between Ghana and Togo in the framework of the same system, as well as the escalation of conflicts between Mali and Burkina Faso, Senegal and Mauritania It shows that the peace effect of the arrangement of the trade system originates from the institutional framework. A comparative analysis of the above three groups of conflicts through the process of seeking and seeking differences shows that when the conflict involves the core interests of the two countries and the strong domestic political pressure, the conflicts will escalate and the peace effect of preferential trade arrangements will not play a role. On the contrary, The peace effect of preferential trading arrangements can only emerge when the conflict does not involve the core interests of the two countries and there is economic interdependence between the two conflict countries.