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自洛克以来,对个人同一性(Personal identity)的心理说明一直是种重要理论,依照这种理论,我们可以设想不同个体“互换身体”的情况,并且这种情况对心理说明提供了支持。当代学者伯纳德.威廉斯(Bernard Williams)对这种理论提出质疑,认为在说明个人同一性问题时,身体要素必不可少。威廉斯的质疑通过反驳互换身体的例子展开,本文将对威廉斯的反驳作出回应,指出该反驳存在的问题,以及为什么在说明我们的存在时,身体的必要性可能并不像威廉斯认为的那样确定。
Since Locke’s psychological account of personal identity has always been an important theory, according to this theory, we can envisage the case of different individuals “exchange body ”, and this situation provides psychological instructions stand by. Contemporary scholar Bernard Williams questions this theory and argues that body elements are essential when describing individual identity issues. Williams’ questioning begins by refuting the example of exchanging bodies, and this article will respond to Williams’s refutations, pointing out the counter-argument and why it is not as physically necessary as Williams thinks That’s ok.