论文部分内容阅读
法的效力渊源究竟是事实还是规范,一直是分析法理学争执不休的问题。为了突破凯尔森将“基础规范”视为法体系效力渊源所造成的超逻辑和形而上的局限性,进而弥合“休谟法则”在事实与规范之间划定的鸿沟,制度法理论秉承奥斯丁、哈特等人借助社会事实而证成法效力的进路,力图通过揭示“制度性事实”的法理功能来证成法效力的渊源。但事实上,制度性事实本身却包含着一个“必须遵守规则/法律”的规范性要素。正是“必须遵守规则/法律”这一调整性规范为制度性事实的生成提供了规范方面的先决要件。因此,在法效力的证成问题上,制度法理论其实并未超越凯尔森,法效力证成过程中的“休谟难题”仍然存在。
Whether the origin of law’s validity is fact or regulation has always been an issue of endless analysis of jurisprudence. In order to break the super-logic and metaphysical limitation caused by Kelsen’s thinking of “foundation norms ” as the origin of the legal system, and to bridge the gap between “Hume’s Law” and the demarcation between fact and norms, The theory adheres to the approach of Austin, Hart et al., Making use of social facts to prove legal validity, trying to prove the origin of legal validity by revealing the legal function of “institutional facts”. In fact, however, institutional facts themselves contain a normative element of “rules / laws to be observed.” It is the regulatory code that “Rules / Laws Must Be Complied” provide a normative prerequisite for the formation of institutional facts. Therefore, on the question of the validity of the legal system, the theory of the system of law does not surpass Kelsen in fact, and the “Hume problem” in the process of the legal validity still exists.