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从内部和外部两个方面剖析了目前小微企业融资难的问题,内部问题主要源于小微企业自身资质低,人员素质不高,很难符合银行信贷审核要求;外部问题主要源于我国金融体制不健全,不利于小微企业融资。运用博弈理论,分析了商业银行在开展集群信贷业务过程中集群与成员之间的博弈关系。结果表明,在互助担保模式下,小微企业集群后,群内企业倒闭数量小于某一数值时,说明集群企业总体发展良好,银行贷款风险较小;若群内企业倒闭数量大于这一数值时,说明集群企业总体发展欠佳,有破产的危险,银行贷款存在较大风险。最后,基于上述观点提出了银行控制和防范贷款风险的对策。
From the internal and external aspects, it analyzes the current problems of small and medium-sized enterprises financing difficulties. The internal problems mainly stem from the low qualifications of the small and micro enterprises and the low quality of personnel, which is difficult to meet the requirements of bank credit audit. The external problems mainly come from the financial System is not perfect, is not conducive to small and micro enterprises financing. Using the game theory, this paper analyzes the game relationship between the cluster and its members in the process of carrying out the cluster credit business. The results show that under the mode of mutual aid and guarantee, after the small and micro enterprises are clustered, the number of enterprises in the group is less than a certain number, indicating that the overall development of the enterprises in the cluster is good and the risk of bank loans is small; if the number of enterprises in the group is larger than this value , Indicating the overall poor development of cluster enterprises, the risk of bankruptcy, bank loans there is a greater risk. Finally, based on the above point of view, we put forward some countermeasures for bank to control and prevent loan risks.