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能否通过援引双边投资条约中的最惠国待遇条款,从而绕开前置程序直接适用国际投资仲裁解决投资争端,一直以来备受争议。近年来ICSID仲裁的案例中,支持者与反对者均试图从条约文义、缔约者意图以及适用后果等角度论证自己的观点。从全面把握缔约者的意图以及限制适用的不良影响出发,对于此类做法应持谨慎态度,并以修改最惠国待遇条款或者嗣后补充声明等方式从根本上解决这一问题。
It has long been controversial whether the investment dispute arbitration should be circumvented by citing the most-favored nation clause in bilateral investment treaties. In the recent cases of ICSID arbitration, both proponents and opponents tried to argue their views from the perspectives of treaty text, intention of contracting parties and the consequences of their application. Starting from a comprehensive grasp of the intention of the contracting parties and the adverse effects of restrictions on their application, the United States should be cautious about such practices and solve the issue fundamentally by modifying the terms of most-favored-nation treatment or subsequent supplemental statements.