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企业不负责任行为同时受到政府管制和产品竞争的双重约束。本文构建了政府与双寡头企业的三阶段博弈模型,分析了政府偏好和政府执行力与政府治理企业不负责任行为的政策的关系,揭示了其中所蕴含的“政府偏好悖论”。研究表明:政府惩治企业不负责任行为的关键,是让企业从不负责任行为中所失大于所得;无论政府的偏好如何,都有可能放松对企业不负责任行为的管制,而且政府越偏好短期社会利益,就越不可能将不负责任的企业清除出市场;政府治理不负责任企业的矛盾心理,根源于企业不负责任行为的两面性。
The irresponsible behavior of an enterprise is simultaneously constrained by both government regulation and product competition. This paper constructs a three-stage game model between government and duopoly enterprises, analyzes the relationship between government preferences and government executive power and the government’s policy of irresponsible corporate governance, and reveals the “paradox of government preference” contained therein. The research shows that the key to punish the irresponsible behavior of the government is to make the enterprise lose more than the income from irresponsible behavior. It is possible to relax the irresponsible regulation of the irrespective of government preference and the government prefers Short-term social interests, the less likely that irresponsible enterprises will be removed from the market. The ambivalence of government governance of irresponsible enterprises stems from the two sides of irresponsible behavior of enterprises.