本文用记实材料证明了厂商进入资本市场的倾向和揭示盈利预测之间正的联系,指出厂商试图通过提示来减轻差别信息的潜在后果。我们的证据还指出,外部融资厂商在证券发售前不久的时期中并不比在其他时间中显著地更恰当来预测。因此,虽然发行更多资本的厂商理应发布更多的预测,但诸如法律责任这样的力量又阻碍着它们在接近证券实际发售之时更频繁的预测。本文也用记实材料证明了经理部的预测并非系统地大于分析家们的现存预测,或随后实现的盈利。因而数据指出,当发售证券时厂商可从发布有利的盈利预测中能在一定程度下受益,然诸如潜在的法律责任和声望成本这样的对抗力量会阻碍它们发布乐观的预测。关键词:经济部预测、外部融资、自愿揭示法律责任。数据来源:除分析家的预测数据须取自 IBES 公司外,本研究中采用的数据从与研究相同的公开的原始资料中收集或购得。 In this paper, we prove the positive relationship between the propensity of firms to enter the capital market and reveal the profit forecast by using the recorded materials, and point out that the manufacturers try to mitigate the potential consequences of differential information through prompts. Our evidence also points out that external financing firms are not predicted to be significantly more appropriate than in other periods of time shortly before the offering. Thus, while firms that issue more capital should be expected to release more predictions, forces such as legal liability prevent them from forecasting more frequently as they approach the actual sale of securities. The paper also uses documented evidence that managers ’forecasts are not systematically larger than the analysts’ existing forecasts, or the profits subsequently realized. Thus the data points out that vendors can benefit to some extent from issuing profitable earnings forecasts when the securities are sold, although countervailing forces such as potential legal liability and prestige costs prevent them from publishing optimistic forecasts. Keywords: Ministry of Economic Affairs forecast, external financing, voluntary disclosure of legal responsibilities. Source: The data used in this study were collected or purchased from the same publicly available source material as the study, except that the analyst’s forecast data was taken outside of IBES.