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以中国上市公司为研究对象,考察第一大股东终极持有的现金流量权比例如何影响公司的债务融资决策,从而揭示了负债在大股东治理中的激励约束作用。实证结果表明,公司的债务水平与非国有大股东的终极现金流量权比例呈现一种非线性的倒“U”型关系,而与国有大股东的终极现金流量权比例则呈现一种非线性的正“U”型关系,说明负债的股权非稀释性和破产机制能够有效约束非国有大股东的行为,但并不能约束国有大股东的行为。
This paper takes Chinese listed companies as the research object and examines how the proportion of the ultimate cash flow right held by the largest shareholder affects the company’s debt financing decision, revealing the incentive and restraint role of debt in the governance of major shareholders. The empirical results show that the ratio of the company’s debt level to the ultimate cash flow right of the non-state-owned major shareholder shows a non-linear inverse U-shaped relationship with the ratio of the ultimate cash flow right to the major state-owned shareholder, Linear positive “U ” type relationship, indicating that the indebtedness of equity and bankruptcy mechanism can effectively restrain the behavior of non-state-owned major shareholders, but it can not restrain the behavior of large state-owned shareholders.