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基于创新竞赛中解答者存在损失规避心理这一现象,运用博弈理论针对创意型和专业型两种创新竞赛分别构建了损失规避情况下的博弈模型,求得解答者的最优努力水平、发起者的最优奖金设定及发起者的最大收益,并将损失规避情况存在与否的结果进行了比较,结果表明:两种不同类型竞赛中解答者为了规避损失,都相应降低了努力水平,而发起者为了保障竞赛的持续进行并未降低奖金的设定.另外,考虑了损失规避逆转情况下参与者的行为决策,并与不存在损失规避情况下的值进行了比较,结果表明:两种不同类型竞赛中解答者因实现自我挑战,忽视物质奖励,反而提升了努力水平.最后,通过算例分析表明了模型的有效性,也为创新竞赛的成功举办提供一定的理论指导.
Based on the phenomenon that the respondents in the innovation competition exist to avoid losses, this paper builds the game model under the circumstance of loss avoidance by using game theory, and finds out the optimal level of effort of the respondents The optimal bonus setting and the maximum profit of the sponsor are compared and the results of the existence of the loss avoidance situation are compared. The results show that in order to avoid losses, the respondents of the two different types of competition all reduce the level of their efforts, In order to protect the competition, the sponsor did not reduce the bonus setting.In addition, the behavior decision-making of the participants under the circumstance of loss avoidance reversal was considered and compared with the value without loss avoidance. The results showed that: In different types of competitions, the respondents increased their level of effort due to self-challenge and neglect of material reward.Finally, the effectiveness of the model was demonstrated through an example analysis, which also provided some theoretical guidance for the successful holding of innovation competition.