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1.理论依据。所有权与经营权的分离,是现代企业的主要特征,两权分离也就产生了委托代理关系。在我国国有企业中,国家作为企业的所有者和投资者委托经营者(厂长、经理)管理和经营国有资产。同时,国家为了维护自己的合法权益,保证国有资产的安全完整和保值增值,实现投资企业价值的最大化,国家作为出资者必然要对经营者的工作加以监督,并作出相应的决策。然而,由于诸多因素的影响,经营者的具体行为目标与投资人往往是不完全一致的,经营者有可
1. Theoretical basis. Separation of ownership and management is the main feature of modern enterprises, the separation of powers also resulted in a principal-agent relationship. Among the state-owned enterprises in our country, the state, as the owner and investor of the enterprise, entrusts managers (plant managers and managers) to manage and manage state-owned assets. In the meantime, in order to safeguard its own legitimate rights and interests, ensure that the state-owned assets are safe and complete, preserve and increase the value of the state assets and maximize the value of the invested enterprises, the state, as a contributor, must supervise the work of the operators and make corresponding decisions. However, due to many factors, the specific target of the manager is not exactly the same with the investor, and the manager can