一、引言 自八十年代后期到九十年代,以俄罗斯为代表的激进改革国家纷纷经历了大幅度的产出滑坡,这一现象引起了经济学家们的关注,对此进行理论解释的文献也层出不穷。在已有的此类文献中,比较有代表性的几项研究都不约而同地试图从厂商的角度寻找产出滑坡的原因。例如墨菲等人认为,改革后生产要素在国有部门和非国有部门间重新进行配置,一些重要的投入品流向了非国有部门,由于投入品之间有互补性,部分投入品的流失就会导致国有部门的产出下降和整个社会的产出滑坡(Murphr,Shleifer and Vish-nv,1992)。再如布兰查德认为,只要考虑到在改革中国有生产者不完全知道投入品供应商是否愿意继续向它提供投入品,就仍然可以得到国有部门产出下降的结论(Blanchard,1996)。又如张军(1997)从改革后的市场结构角度出发,认为激进改革的结果并不一定是形成一个充分竞争的市场结构,而可能是形成一个具有一定垄断特征的市场结构。这样,原有的国有部门在摆脱了配额约束后,就主动减少产量,并以垄断价格 I. Introduction Since the late 1980s and 1990s, the radical reform countries represented by Russia have experienced a substantial decline in output and output. This phenomenon has aroused the concern of economists and the theoretical explanation for this Also endless. In the existing literature, several of the more representative studies are trying to find out the reasons for the decline of output from the perspective of manufacturers. For example, Murphy et al. Argue that after the reform, the factors of production were reallocated between state-owned and non-state-owned sectors and some important inputs went to non-state-owned sectors. Because of the complementarities between inputs, the loss of some inputs Leading to a decline in the output of the state sector and a decline in the output of society as a whole (Murphr, Shleifer and Vish-nv, 1992). For another, Blanchard argues that conclusions can still be drawn from the declining output of the state sector (Blanchard, 1996), given that in the reform Chinese producers do not fully know whether an input supplier is willing to continue providing inputs to it. Another example is Zhang Jun (1997) from the post-reform market structure point of view, that the result of radical reform is not necessarily the formation of a fully competitive market structure, but may be the formation of a certain monopoly characteristics of the market structure. In this way, the original state-owned sector, after getting rid of the quota constraint, voluntarily reduced its output and sold it at a monopoly price