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随着我国现代企业制度的建立,引入新型管理层激励机制成为我国完善公司治理结构、提高企业活力和竞争力的重要途径。经理股票期权拥有激励逻辑清晰,节省现金等优点,在西方国家被广泛应用。然而,我国经理股票期权试点的实践经验证明,由于我国的资本市场、经理人市场等外部条件尚未成熟,公司治理结构尚不完善,机械引进国外的制度可能出现种种问题。因此,有必要考察在我国推行经理股票期权制度的条件、现状,探索适合我国的激励机制。本文对经理股票期权制度的激励逻辑和存在问题进行了分析,并借助实证数据研究了中国的管理层所有权与公司业绩的关系,提供了现阶段在我国推行经理股票期权制度的政策建议。
With the establishment of modern enterprise system in our country, the introduction of a new type of management incentive mechanism has become an important way for our country to improve the corporate governance structure and improve the vitality and competitiveness of enterprises. Managerial stock options have the incentive logic clear, save cash and other advantages, is widely used in Western countries. However, the practical experience of China’s pilot stock option pilot proves that due to the immature external conditions such as capital market and manager’s market in our country, the corporate governance structure is not yet perfect, and problems may occur in the system of introducing machinery abroad. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the conditions and current situation of implementing the executive stock option system in our country and explore the incentive mechanism suitable for our country. This paper analyzes the motivation logic and existing problems of manager’s stock option system, and uses the empirical data to study the relationship between management’s ownership and the company’s performance in China, and provides the policy suggestion of implementing manager’s stock option system in our country.