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基于非正式制度安排的声誉机制视角,分析了中国证券市场股利支付的板块倒置现象及内在机理。研究发现,成长性较高的公司出于未来再融资的需要,通过现金分红建立良好的声誉。经验证据表明,中小板和创业板市场的现金股利支付力度均高于主板市场,而且,中小板和创业板上市公司成长性越高,现金股利支付力度越大。此外,中小板和创业板上市公司通过股票股利传递未来发展信息。本研究为声誉机制在投资者保护弱化国家中的股利分配提供了经验证据,也为监管层改善和提高上市公司股利支付提供了政策依据。
Based on the perspective of the unofficial institutional arrangement of reputation mechanism, this paper analyzes the plate inversion and its intrinsic mechanism of dividend payout in China’s securities market. The study found that companies with higher growth out of the need for future refinancing, through cash dividends to establish a good reputation. Empirical evidence shows that the cash dividend payment of SME board and GEM market are higher than that of the main board market. Moreover, the higher the growth of SME board and GEM companies, the greater the cash dividend payment. In addition, small board and GEM listed companies through the stock dividend delivery of future development information. This study provides empirical evidence for the dividend distribution of reputation mechanism in investor protection weakened countries and also provides policy basis for regulators to improve and enhance the dividend payout of listed companies.