The life of man may be viewed in many different ways. He may be viewed as one species of mammal and considered in a purely biological light. From this point of view his success has been overwhelming. He can live in all climates and in every part of the world where there is water. His numbers have increased and are increasing still faster. He owes his success to certain things which distinguish him from other animals： speech， fire， agriculture， writing， tools， and large-scale co-operation.
　　It is in the matter of co-operation that he fails of complete success. Man， like other animals， is filled with impulses and passions which， on the whole， ministered to1 survival while man was emerging. But his intelligence has shown him that passions are often self-defeating， and that his desires could be more satisfied， and his happiness more complete， if certain of his passions were given less scope and other more. Man has not viewed himself more at most times and in most places as a species competing with other species. He has been interested，not in man， but in men； and men have been sharply divided into friends and enemies. At times this division has been useful to those who emerged victoriously： for example， in the conflict between white men and red Indians. But as intelligence and invention increase the complexity of social organizations， there is a continual growth in the benefits of co-operation， and a continual diminution2 of the benefits of competition. Ethics and moral codes are necessary to man because of the conflict between intelligence and impulse. Given intelligence only， or impulse only， there would be no place for ethics.

　　Men are passionate， headstrong， and rather mad. By their madness they inflict upon themselves， and upon others， disasters which may be of immense magnitude. But， although the life of impulse is dangerous， it must be preserved if human existence is not to lose its savour. Between the two poles of impulse and control， an ethic by which men can live happily must find a middle point. It is through this conflict in the innermost nature of men that the need for ethics arises.
　　Men is more complex in his impulses and desires than any other animals， and from this complexity his difficulties spring. He is neither completely gregarious3， like ants and bees， nor completely solitary， like lions and tigers. He is a semigregarious animal. Some of his impulses and desires are social，some are solitary. The social part of his nature appears in the fact that solitary confinement is a very severe form of punishment； the other part appears in love of privacy and unwillingness to speak to strangers. Graham Wallas， in his excellent book Hunan Nature in Politics， points out that men who live in a crowded area such as London develop a defence mechanism of social behavior designed to protect them from an unwelcome excess of human contacts.4 People sitting next to each other in a bus or a suburban train usually do not speak to each other， but if something alarming occurs， such as an air raid or even an unusually thick fog， the strangers at once begin to feel each other to be friends and converse without restraint. This sort of behavior illustrates the oscillation5 between the private and social parts of human nature. It is because we are not completely social that we have need of ethics to suggest purposes， and of moral codes to inculcate6 rules of action. Ants， it seems， have no such need： they behave always as the interests of their community dictate7. 　　But man， even if he could bring himself to be submissive to public interest as the ant， would not feel complete satisfaction， and would be aware that a part of his nature which seems to him important was being starved. It cannot be said that the solitary part of human nature is less to be valued than the social part. In religious phraseology， the two appear separately in the two commandments of the Gospels to love God and to love our neighbour. For those who no longer believe in God or traditional theology， a certain change of phraseology may be necessary， but not a fundamental change as to ethical values. The mystic， the poet， the artist， and the scientific discoverer are in their inmost being solitary. What they do may be useful to others， and its usefulness may be an encouragement to them， but， in the moments when they are most alive and most completely fulfilling what they feel to be their function， they are not thinking of the rest of mankind but are pursuing a vision.
　　We must therefore admit two distinct elements in human excellence， one social， the other solitary. An ethic which takes account only of the one， or only of the other， will be incomplete and unsatisfying.

　　The need of ethics in human affairs arises not only from man’s incomplete gregariousness or from his failure to live up to an inner vision； it arises also from another difference between man and other animals. The actions of human beings do not all spring from direct impulse， but are capable of being controlled and directed by conscious purpose. To some slight extent higher animals possess this faculty. A dog will allow his master to hurt him in pulling a thorn out of his foot. K？hler’s8 apes did various uninstinctive things in the endeavor to reach bananas. Nevertheless， it remains true even with the higher animals that most of their acts are inspired by direct impulse. This is not true of civilized men. From the moment when he gets out bed in spite of a passionate desire to remain lying down， to the moment when he finds himself alone in the evening， he has few opportunities of acting on impulse except by finding fault with underlings and choosing the least disagreeable of the foods offered for his midday meal. In all other respects he is guided， not by impulse， but by deliberate purpose. What he does， he does， not because the act is pleasant， but because he hopes that it will bring him money or some other reward. It is because of this power of acting with a view to a desired end that ethics and moral rules are effective， since they suggest， on the other hand， a distinction between good and bad purposes， and on the other hand， a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate means of achieving purposes. But it is easy in dealing with civilized men to lay too much stress on conscious purpose and too little on the importance of spontaneous impulse. The moralist is tempted to ignore the claims of human nature， and if he does so， it is likely that nature will ignore the claims of the moralist. 　　政治学理论必须考虑的那些重要事实关注社会集团的性质。集团可能各不相同，其中最重要的区别在于凝聚的原因、目的、规模、集团对个体控制的强度，以及政府的形式。这些会引出权力以及集权或者分权的问题，而这或许就是整个政治学理论中最重要的部分。这个问题很难求解，因为权力集中有技术方面的原因，可是那些拥有权力的人几乎都会滥用权力。民主制度尝试解决这个问题，可是实情往往并不盡如人意。
　　新技术对社会产生影响，引发大量极其复杂的问题，尤其是当这个社会的组织方式和思想习惯还在按照旧体制的那套运行。人类历史上有两次大变革便是如此，第一次是农业的诞生，第二次是科学工业主义的诞生。每一次变革，技术进步都给人类带来了巨大的不幸。农业引进了农奴制、活人祭、男尊女卑，还有从第一个古埃及王朝开始到罗马帝国灭亡期间此起彼伏的专制帝国。科学技术入侵所造成的种种恶果，恐怕才刚刚拉开序幕。其中最大的恶果就是导致战争升级，可是还有很多其他的恶果，主要包括对自然资源的竭泽而渔，政府对个人自主权的毁灭，通过教育和宣传等核心部门控制人的思想。由于科学对因循守旧的人类思维施加影响，这些恶果看起来不断扩大。现代科技让统治者拥有了更多的权力，使得根据某人头脑里的构想来创造整体社会成为可能。这种可能性导致人们沉迷于体制而不能自拔，忘却了个体的基本诉求。寻找一种公正的方式处理这些诉求，是我们这个时代的主要问题之一。
　　在我们身处的这个世界，巨大的希望或可怕的恐惧有着同样的可能性。恐惧会在人群当中蔓延，很容易让世界变得沉闷阴郁。而希望呢，因为需要想象力和勇气，所以在大多数人的头脑中并没有那么生动，就是因为不够生动，所以看起来好像是乌托邦。某种思想的懒惰成为唯一的拦路虎。如果可以克服这一点，一种崭新的幸福对人类而言将是触手可及的。
　　1. minister to： 给予援助。
　　2. diminution： 减少，缩小。
　　3. gregarious：（动物）群居的，（人）爱社交的。
　　4. Graham Wallas： 格雷厄姆·华莱斯（1858—1932），英国教育家和政治学家，倡导用实验的方法研究人的行为；defence mechanism： 防御机制，指人类自我用来对抗其所察觉到的危险并保护自身的心理过程，也指在这一过程中所运用的技巧。这个过程通常是无意识的。
　　5. oscillation： 摆动。
　　6. inculcate： 反复灌输。
　　7. dictate： 命令，规定。
　　8. K？hler： 克勒（1887—1967），德国心理学家、格式塔心理学派创始人之一，通过实验发现黑猩猩具有设计和应用简单工具、建立简单结构的能力，著有《类人猿的智力》等。
　　9. imperative： 极为重要的，紧急的；reproduction：生育，繁衍。
　　10. acquisitiveness： 贪婪攫取。
　　11. congenial： 合意的，相宜的；endowment： 天资，天赋。
　　12. heredity： 遗传（性）。
　　13. Leibniz： 莱布尼兹（1646—1716），德国自然科学家、哲学家、数学家；possible world：可能世界，运用此概念的理论家认为，实际世界是很多可能世界中的一个。
　　14. serfdom： 农奴制；subjection：征服，强行统治；despotic： 专制的，暴虐的。
　　15. intoxication： 陶醉，极度兴奋。
　　16. listless： 倦怠的，无精打采的；gloom：忧郁，阴暗。