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在中央苏区的北大门广昌失守后,当“继续在内线作战取得决定的胜利已经极少可能以致最后完全没有可能”时,中共中央、中革军委不得不着手考虑将中央红军撤出中央苏区,在撤离计划得到共产国际的认可之后,7月初先后进行了几项意在配合中央红军战略转移的部署,即派出红七军团为北上抗日先遣队,派出红六军团西进,并指示红二十五军撤出鄂豫皖苏区进行战略转移。这些战略部署虽是在“左”倾冒险主义的大背景下做出的,但作为
After the fall of Guangchang, the northern gate of the Central Soviet Area, the CPC Central Committee and the China Revolutionary Reform Commission had to start thinking of withdrawing the Central Red Army when “it is extremely unlikely that the decision to continue the victory in the field will be made impossible.” After the withdrawal plan was recognized by the Comintern, the Central Soviet Area successively conducted several deployments aimed at supporting the strategic transfer of the Central Red Army in early July. That is, the Red Army Corps was dispatched to advance the anti-Japanese troops northward and the Red Six Corps westward was sent and instructed The Twenty-fifth Army retreated from Jiangsu, Anhui and Soviet areas for strategic transfer. Although these strategic plans have been made under the background of “leftist” adventurism, as the